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Fang Dongmei (1899–1977) is among the most influential Chinese philosophers who 
lived and worked in Taiwan during the second half of the 20th century. The present arti-
cle aims to clarify his view on the basic nature of the human Self. This assessment is more 
multifaceted than it seems at a first glimpse, for Fang’s philosophy is also more complex 
than it seems. As a member of the so-called neo-conservative streams of thought, he 
criticized the Western-type modernization and aimed to revive the holistic onto-episte-
mology of classical Confucianism. On the other hand, he highlighted the importance of 
its basic paradigm which underlay the Confucian discourses from their very beginning, 
i.e. since the Book of Changes, namely the principle of creative creativity (shengshengbuxi 生
生不息). The alleged contradiction between his advocating of holism and creativity, has 
been reflected in the apparent dichotomy between the social and relational essence of the 
Confucian Moral Self on the one side, and individual uniqueness on the other. The paper 
aims to show that both seeming contradictions are actually parts of the same theoretical 
principle defining the complementary interactions of binary oppositions. 
Keywords: Modern Confucianism, New Confucianism, Fang Dongmei, Taiwanese phi-
losophy, Modern Chinese philosophy, holism, individuality, Moral Self
Modernizacija filozofije ustvarjalne ustvarjalnosti:  
Fang Dongmeijeva združitev holizma in individualnosti
Izvleček
Fang Dongmei (1899–1977) sodi med najvplivnejše kitajske filozofe, ki so v drugi polo-
vici 20. stoletja živeli in delali na Tajvanu. Ta članek obravnava njegov pogled na osnovno 
naravo človeškega sebstva. Ta naloga je bolj zapletena, kot se kaže na prvi pogled, tako kot 
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je tudi Fangova filozofija precej bolj kompleksna, kot se zdi. Kot predstavnik t. i. neokon-
servativnih idejnih tokov je Fang kritiziral modernizacijo zahodnega tipa z namenom oži-
vitve holistične ontoepistemologije klasičnega konfucijanstva. Po drugi strani pa je pou-
darjal pomen njegove temeljne paradigme, na kateri so konfucijanski diskurzi osnovani že 
od vsega začetka, torej od Knjige premen naprej, in ki prihaja do izraza v načelu ustvarjalne 
ustvarjalnosti (shengshengbuxi 生生不息). Domnevno protislovje med njegovo afirmaci-
jo holizma in ustvarjalnosti se zrcali v navidezni dihotomiji med družbeno in relacijsko 
esenco konfucijanskega moralnega sebstva na eni strani ter enkratnostjo individuuma na 
drugi. V članku nameravam prikazati, da sta obe navidezni protislovji pravzaprav del ene-
ga in istega teoretskega načela, ki opredeljuje vzajemno komplementarno interakcijo med 
binarnimi opozicijami. 
Ključne besede: moderno konfucijanstvo, novo konfucijanstvo, Fang Dongmei, tajvanska 
filozofija, moderna kitajska filozofija, holizem, individualnost, moralno sebstvo
Introduction: Fang’s Life and Work
Fang Dongmei 方東美, who is also known to English speakers under the name 
Thomé H. Fang, was born into a family of intellectuals in the central Chinese 
province of Anhui. He was thus exposed to the Chinese classics at a very early 
age. After completing secondary school he attended Jinling University in Nanjing, 
where he was very active in the student movement. In 1919 he participated in the 
student demonstrations in Nanjing, which were organized in support of the May 
Fourth cultural reforms. In 1920, he met the American philosopher John Dewey 
during his lecture tour of China, an encounter which awakened a keen interest in 
Fang for Western philosophy. After graduating, he went to America, where after 
only one year he earned his MA at the University of Wisconsin, and then two 
years later obtained his PhD at Ohio State University. Following his return to 
China, he taught at different universities, including Wuchang University, South-
east University in Nanjing, the Political University (Zhengzhi daxue 政治大學) 
and, briefly, Peking University. While Fang was in Nanjing, the Japanese invasion 
forced the university to move to Chongqing in the southwest province of Sichuan 
( Jiang and Yu 1995, 880). The difficult wartime conditions, uncertainty and in-
security during this period led Fang to renew his interest in traditional Chinese 
culture and classical philosophy as a form of refuge and solace (Fang 1959, 17). 
In 1948 he moved to Taiwan to teach at National Taiwan University, where he 
remained until his retirement.
His principal works in Chinese were published in 2004 as the Collected Works 
of Fang Dongmei (Fang Dongmei quan ji 方東美全集), in 12 volumes (see Fang 
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2004a). They include many of his crucial texts, such as Science, Philosophy and 
Human Life (科學,哲學與人生), which was first published in 1936, A Survey 
of the Life Philosophies of Ancient Chinese Philosophers (中國先哲人生哲學綱要, 
first published in 1937), Three Types of Philosophical Wisdom (哲學三慧), The Ideal 
of Life and Cultural Types (生活理想與文化類型), and several others, less well-
known, but nevertheless important (see for instance Fang 2004b; 2004c; 2004d). 
Under the name Thomé H. Fang2 he also wrote a number of books in Eng-
lish, including The Chinese View of Life: The Philosophy of Comprehensive Harmony 
(1980b), Creativity in Man and Nature (1980a) and Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit 
and Its Development (1981).3
Fang’s theoretical works are characterized by his ability to combine a thorough 
knowledge of Western philosophy, from the ancient to the contemporary, with tra-
ditional Chinese philosophy, especially Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist thought. 
His work also shows the influence of Indian philosophy. Among modern Western 
philosophers, Nietzsche had the greatest influence on his theoretical development 
(Fang 1936, 195). Several of his works are dedicated to comparing Indian and 
European philosophy in order to define the characteristics of traditional Chinese 
philosophy. 
Fang Dongmei and the Taiwanese Modern New Confucianism  
(Xin ruxue 新儒學)
The most influential contributions of Taiwanese philosophy to the preservation 
of the Chinese philosophical tradition, and also to the development of modern 
Chinese philosophy in a more general sense, can undoubtedly be found in the 
philosophical work of the second generation of the so-called Modern or New 
Confucian stream of thought. Most of the members of this generation were living 
and working in Taiwan. However, there are several different opinions regarding 
the question as to who can actually be counted as a representative of this stream 
of thought. Some scholars, for instance, want to include the historian Qian Mu 
錢穆 (1895–1990); however, if we concentrate on Modern Confucian philosophy, 
2 For the sake of clarity, I will differentiate between Fang’s work in Chinese and English: in the ref-
erences of the present paper, all his Chinese works will be indicated with his family and his given 
name (Fang), whereas his English works will only include references to his first name, as commonly 
applied in all other references to Western sources and literature. 
3 For a comprehensive and in deep study of his philosophical system, many other works written by 
Fang Dongmei (i.e. Thomé Fang) in Chinese should also be consulted, at least the ones stated in 
the bibliography of this article under Fang 1931; 1936; 1937; 1959; 1978; 1979; 1980; 1982; 1983; 
1984; 1989; 1992. 
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than it is not very appropriate to include his work in this group. The most com-
monly agreed names are Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–1982), Tang Junyi 唐君毅 
(1909–1978) and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995). However, beside these 
three scholars I believe that Fang Dongmei (1899–1977) should also be included 
in the second generation, even though he is sometimes associated with the first. 
As the teacher of some of the members of the third generation, it seems simply 
more appropriate to include him among the generation of thinkers immediately 
preceding this group.
On the other hand, Fang Dongmei never considered himself to be a Modern 
Confucian, given that his philosophical interests also included traditional Bud-
dhist and Daoist thought. Regarding this question, some scholars (e.g. Li 2002, 
269) claim that Fang’s work stands beyond the Confucian tradition, because he 
did not regard Confucianism as the only legitimate philosophy and all others as 
heresies, as, for instance, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 did. On the contrary, Fang Dong-
mei argued that Laozi’s Daoism was the leading and most legitimate philosoph-
ical school during ancient times. Besides, many scholars believe he saw Confu-
cianism, Daoism, Mohism and Buddhism as mutually interacting and integrating 
components of a holistic cultural process, rather than as several distinct schools 
of thought. However, he still acknowledged the preeminent role of Confucian 
thought in the Chinese tradition:
In Chinese philosophy, Confucianism is the body of thought that guides 
people through their lives. As for Daoism, it collapsed during the corrupt 
period of the Han dynasty. Even though it was eventually revived, and 
with it the renewed striving towards ideals, in our view the real Daoists 
are those artists who consider the world to be useless. […] After the 
Wei-Jin period, Buddhist thought spread throughout Chinese society, 
and compensated for certain Daoist deficiencies. The Buddhists, howev-
er, seek their own personal salvation, which has nothing to do with the 
world […]. (Fang 1989, 1056)
These considerations aside, the content, concepts and methodological assump-
tions of Fang’s own thought were to a great extent integrated into the framework 
of Neo-Confucian theories, which provided the “thought-base” for most of the 
modern Confucian discourses that appeared on the transition from the second to 
third millennium (Sernelj 2020, 96). However, here we encounter an additional 
problem with respect to Fang’s classification, for he not only distanced himself 
from Modern Confucians, but also from their historical conceptual base, i.e. from 
the Neo-Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties. In his view—and regardless 
Azijske_studije_2020_3_FINAL.indd   144 9. 09. 2020   13:21:17
145Asian Studies VIII (XXIV ), 3 (2020), pp. 141–160
of their merit in preserving the classical Confucian tradition and its holistic 
worldview—these philosophers (especially Zhu Xi’s school) relied too heavily on 
a mechanistic rationality, as exemplified in the structural logic of the li 理 con-
cept (structure, structural pattern). This resulted in a deformation of the holistic 
tradition in philosophy, in which the binary poles of (rational) structural pattern 
(li 理) and vitality (qi 氣) were seen as two divergent principles, even though in 
their mutual, complementary interaction they were still preserving the harmonic 
unity of facts, values and the sphere of aesthetic experience (Thompson 2017, 13). 
However, due to these formal divergences, Fang Dongmei did not consider the 
Modern Confucians as authentic heirs of Confucianism.
In the category of Confucianism, Fang includes Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi 
(Fang 2004b, 155), while he thinks the Han Confucians were “lowly and unwor-
thy of mention” and the Song Neo-Confucians were not authentic followers of 
Confucianism. He criticized Neo-Confucian philosophy as “hybrid” and full of 
latent Daoist and Chan Buddhist elements (ibid., 64). In his view, Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 
thought was little more than a compendium of the ideas of Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤, 
Zhang Zai 張載 and the Cheng brothers 程顥, 程頤 (ibid., 66), but without being 
treated within a coherent system; hence, according to Fang, Zhu Xi’s philosophy 
was full of logical contradictions (ibid.).
Fang Dongmei is certainly an important and influential theorist, whose work 
made a significant contribution to the theoretical reflection on Chinese modern-
ization processes and the effort to find creative solutions to the challenges posed 
by Western philosophy. However, as opposed to most Modern New Confucians, 
Fang Dongmei tried to revive the Chinese tradition based not on Neo-Confucian 
discourses, but primarily on classical Confucianism, enriched by the aesthetic and 
metaphysical concepts of classical Daoism and Sinicized Buddhism. 
Here, I should point out that my own understanding of the original Chinese ex-
pression Ru xue (Confucianism; literally: “the teachings of the educated”) is broad-
er than Fang’s own definitions. In my view, it has not been limited to the teachings 
of Confucius as a historical personage, but instead should be seen as referring to 
the dominant cultural discourse of the Chinese (and East Asian) tradition, and 
therefore as comprising a wide range of the prevailing philosophical discourses 
that combined to make up the history of Chinese (and East Asian) philosophy 
over a period of over 2,500 years. As a specific example of how these different 
views are applied in actual theory, we can point out that Fang always interpreted 
Daoism, which includes numerous critical, individualistic and free-thinking ele-
ments, within the framework of a neo-conservative ideology that represents an 
essential, almost paradigmatic characteristic of Modern New Confucianism. 
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For these reasons, I believe that Fang Dongmei can be considered a representa-
tive of Modern Confucianism, especially within the context of modern Taiwanese 
philosophy.
Life as Harmonious Creation
Fang believed that Chinese classical philosophy and epistemology were not based 
on mathematical or proto-scientific paradigms, but on aesthetic ones (Fang 1957, 
195–235). However, his ontology is closely linked to the rational structure of the 
universe, as found in the ancient Chinese classic, The Book of Changes (Yi jing). 
Fang also described the process of cosmic change (constant creative creativity 
of existence) as an expression of rationality, which is rooted in (and at the same 
time encompasses) the minutely structured system of the “logic of creation” (Fang 
1936, 24–26).
In the centre of Fang’s philosophy lies the concept of life or the living (sheng 生). 
According to Fang, all schools of traditional Chinese thought emerged from cos-
mology, which is defined by the all-prevailing instinct for life, survival, the vital 
impulse that constantly creates and recreates everything that exists. For Fang, the 
cosmos was a “living environment” (shengmingde huanjing 生命的環境), perme-
ated by “circles of rational principles and feelings” (qingli tuan 情理團). While the 
structural patterns of existence remain fundamental, feelings (qing 情) represent 
the primary source of life (shengmingde yuantai 生命的原態): “Life is a world of 
feelings, and its essence is a continuous, creative desire and impulse” (ibid., 25). 
For him, life is thus “a flexible, extendable power” (ibid., 163).
The universe is a living entity that cannot be reduced to mere inertial physical 
stuff. Based on these premises, Fang then added a third category to the dualism 
of matter and idea, namely that of life: “We can see that life is a novel, original 
phenomenon; we cannot deal with it in the same way as with matter. Its system is 
predicated upon an organic wholeness.” (ibid., 179)
This living universe is full of energy, and everything in it is structurally connected 
to the living process that penetrates the entire realm. Human thought is also rooted 
in this colourful, sensitive and creative palette of life itself; it is not merely a product 
of rationality: “Life is the root of the thought, and thoughts are symbols or signs 
of life” (ibid., 164). Accordingly, even science “is a symbol of the sentiments of life” 
(ibid., 138) and its value lies in “developing the human desire for life” (ibid., 160).
Life is thus the fundamental driving force of the universe. For this reason, Fang 
calls it the original (Fang 1982, 149) or ultimate substance (Fang 1984, 28) of the 
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universe. However, he stresses that while this ultimate substance is transcendent 
(chaoyue 超越), it is not so supremely unique as to be an absolute (chaojue 超絕) 
(ibid., 20). Fang Dongmei’s ontology thus clearly belongs to the holistic realm of 
what Modern Confucians called “immanent transcendence”.4 
According to most interpreters, (see e.g. Li 2002, 265; Fang and Li, 895), such a 
view may be called a “life-ontology” (shengming bentilun 生命本體論). Li Chen-
yang also writes that this life-ontology is more than a “Gaia hypothesis”; for Fang, 
it is reality. In this regard, the influence of Western philosophers such as Hegel, 
Bergson, and Whitehead on Fang is evident.
The second central concept of Fang’s philosophy is the idea of “comprehensive 
harmony” (guangda hexie 廣大和諧), which is characteristic of the traditional 
Chinese understanding of the world. In this, the universe strives towards a har-
monious unity of all the individual particles and entities within its system. In 
material terms, it is empty, or “void” and expressed only through the richness and 
insight of its spirit.
In Fang’s reading of the history of Chinese philosophy, he also stressed the har-
monious interplay of various schools of thought, rather than their differences and 
conflicts. One could argue that Fang was too idealistic and romantic in his un-
derstanding of these philosophies. However, for Fang, even if harmony was not a 
reality, it still represented the Chinese “ideal” (Li 2002, 266).
4 Several Modern Confucians, and particularly Mou Zongsan, often noted that Confucian phi-
losophy never established a clear demarcation line between the realms of immanence and tran-
scendence. However, this did not imply that their philosophy was lacking transcendent elements. 
Therefore, Mou coined the new concept of immanent transcendence, although this soon became 
very controversial, for Western scholars especially reproached him for coining an oxymoron, con-
sisting of two different and mutually incompatible notions. However, many contemporary scholars 
(e.g. Lee 2002, 226–27) believe that their critique was based on a misunderstanding, rooted in 
the claim that Mou has applied the term transcendence in the strict sense, which is obviously not 
true. However, it is helpful to know that traditional Chinese notions of immanent transcendence 
like tian, dao, tianming or tiandao, can be understood as representing both the source of values 
and the basis of existence (ibid., 229). Its axiological and creative connotations are thus of utmost 
importance in Chinese philosophy. In the history of Western philosophy, however, transcendence 
is generally understood either in the epistemological or the ontological sense. In the first instance, 
this term signifies going beyond certain cognitive abilities (or possibilities of recognition—espe-
cially those linked to experience) in order to reach the realm of an integrated or comprehensive 
recognition (quanbu renzhi nengli, ibid.). The Western critics of the notion, however, only consid-
ered the ontological connotations of the Western concept—which primarily denotes a separation 
and isolation from the world (or existence), while also implying the notion of creatio ex nihilo (wu 
zhong chuangzao) (ibid.)—and do not take into account the equally significant epistemological 
connotations of the term. It is important to stress that the concept of transcendence as applied in 
the notion of “immanent transcendence” is primarily linked to its epistemological connotations, 
and is by no means limited to the strict sense of the Western ontological scope. 
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Holistic Link between Nature and Morals
The belief in harmony and a harmonic universe is also reflected in Fang’s un-
derstanding of morality or moral philosophy. Because the cosmic tendency to 
establish and preserve harmony through the concept of shengsheng 生生 (crea-
tive creativity) is almighty and unlimited, it does not have merely ontological, 
but also ethical and epistemological dimensions. For him, the natural life order 
is tightly linked to the moral order (Fang 1979, 351). This means that Fang’s 
philosophy has no room for a division between facts and values. The universe is 
enriched by goodness, which derives not only from the pragmatic postulates of 
human co-existence, but is a priori a part of its essential structure, as reflected 
in the sphere of pure aesthetics. Fang thus views morality as the essence of life 
and a concrete embodiment of the deepest human values. Human existence is 
not merely about survival, but presupposes the search for meaning and pur-
pose. The aesthetic side of culture and art is the expression of human creativity 
(Fang 1984, 149), which is always oriented towards perfecting the deficiencies 
of the world into which we are thrown; Dao represents the path that leads to 
perfection as well as the path upon which facts and values are merged into an 
organically structured harmony (ibid., 158). In this way, Fang strove to unite 
the three ideals of epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, i.e. truth, goodness, and 
beauty. He was also convinced that qing 情 (the emotive reactions) and li 理 
(the rational principles) cannot be separated. Although Fang’s philosophy is 
established, as we have seen before, on his “life-ontology”, it can thus also 
be called “value-centred-ontology”, because, for him, life is the basic value of 
existence and both life and value are rooted in the Dao 道, i.e. the ultimate 
principle of existence. In his view, Dao represents the all-encompassing and 
all-pervading unity, which is the primary source of life, value, and their harmo-
nious fusion.
In Zhexue san hui 哲學三慧 (Three Types of Philosophical Wisdom) Fang defined 
philosophy as a synthesis between the rational structure of thought (li 理) and 
emotions (qing 情). According to the Book of Changes both originate from the 
extreme pole (tai ji 太極), i.e. the onto-epistemological, indescribable and unex-
plainable ancient origin of all existence. Thus, qing 情 and li 理 are not merely the 
base of all philosophy, but also the fundament of existence as such. Fang believes 
that the two elements represent a binary category, for their reciprocal relation is 
correlative and complementary. Li Chengyang (2002, 264) states that Fang sees 
the mutual, reciprocal interaction between li 理 and qing 情 as a process that 
pervades facts as well as possibilities, and from which philosophy draws its origin, 
truth and mystery.
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He based his interpretation of traditional Chinese philosophy on a holistic view, 
according to which man forms a unity with space and time. In the forefront of 
his interpretation we can find the traditional unity of values, which through con-
stant creativity includes the activities of Heaven (Tian 天), and man. Regardless 
of his declaratively broad starting points, which included all the most influential 
discourses from ancient and classical Chinese philosophy, it was precisely this 
very central point through which he proved that his thoughts were grounded 
in the classical Mencian viewpoint of four natural origins (si duan 四段) of hu-
man goodness; in this way, he (regardless of his—also clearly stated—detachment 
from Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties) also proved that in 
fact he followed precisely this very tradition that formed the foundations of this 
pre-modern Confucian reform. 
The universe is a place to live in, and not a place to escape from, because 
it is a realm of value. Similarly, human nature is something to rely upon, 
and not something to dispense with, because it has been proved to be not 
sinful but innocent (Fang 1980b, 99).
However, Fang detached himself from this line of thought by constantly em-
phasizing that the natural goodness of man is a common characteristic found in 
all traditional Chinese philosophers (ibid., 87–115). He even tried to convince 
readers that Xunzi, who is considered to be Mencius’ main opponent, in essence 
shares this opinion, the only difference being that he swapped the roles of nature 
and emotions:
We can find no valid reasons for the theory of evil nature. Even Hsüntze 
held the belief that “human nature is a natural achievement” or “human 
nature attains itself after the pattern of constant nature ...” The reason 
why Hsüntze considered human nature to be evil is that he confused it 
with emotion which, logically speaking, is of a lower type than original 
nature. The evilness of human nature is here inferred, a posteriori, from 
the evilness of emotion. Here Hsüntze commits a fallacy of the confusion 
of logical types. (ibid., 109) 
In his comparative aspect and endeavour to come up with a harmonious synthesis 
of his own work, Fang mainly focused on the common points of the three central 
schools of classical Chinese philosophy. He ascertained that they are all connected 
by the concept of Dao, which each treats from a slightly different aspect and in a 
slightly different way, but all three are basically describing the concept of holistic 
harmony and the tendency for perfection. As Dao is possible only in the context 
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of holistic worldviews, it can reflect the method of immanent transcendence as 
well as the unity of facts and values, absoluteness and relativity.
Confucianism, Democracy and Science
For Fang Dongmei, the most important principle in a democratic society is tol-
erance. For this reason, he criticized Mencius for his harsh attacks against the 
Moist school, which had contributed greatly to the Chinese intellectual tradition, 
especially in terms of offering new insights and establishing a basic framework 
for the growth of science in China (Fang 1992, 437). Fang was also convinced 
that the principle of creativity, which is central to his theories (Fang 1980a, 36), 
could represent a key element for the future development of Chinese science and 
democracy. Furthermore, man’s mission of cultural creation in the different realms 
of art, literature, science, religion and social institutions is being carried forward, 
so that any imperfections existing in Nature and Man may be brought to ideal 
perfection (Fang 1980b, 11). However, an important premise which preconditions 
such perfection is the revival of tradition, for the realization of contemporary 
ideals must be based upon a humanistic spirit: “Only if we work hard and never 
forget our ideals, will we be able to water the sere tree of life, so that it can grow 
new roots and put forth luxuriant foliage” (Fang 1980, 6). 
Like other Modern Confucians, Fang acknowledged that the Chinese intellectual 
tradition had failed to lay an adequate foundation for the development of science 
(which he generally supported). In this context, he claimed (Fang 1980b, 19) that 
science has not yet gained the dominant position in Chinese culture that it should 
have. He explained this failure with the holistic nature of the Chinese intellectual 
tradition:
Regardless of the stream of thought to which its actual contents may 
belong, or whether it deals with man or the cosmos, Chinese philosophy 
is always founded upon a holistic wholeness. In Confucian terminology, 
this is called “the doctrine of pervasive unity”, and it is common to all 
Chinese philosophy. (Fang 1978, 45)
For Fang, the reason was not hard to find. The Chinese can easily realize the 
importance of science as a form of knowledge. But in the West, several meanings 
have been attached to it. The Greeks, for instance, saw it as a rational explanation 
of the intrinsic order of things in the universe to which human beings are har-
moniously related. Science in this sense we can also find in China—but science 
naturally means more than that (Fang 1980b, 19). And even if we could equate 
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the Greek conception to science as such, there would still be a problem. The 
Greek thinkers conceived of the things behind the forms of the specious present 
as existing in eternity. They explained nature only quantitatively as a mechanical 
process of combinations and separations. Fang Dongmei pointed out that the 
Chinese usually think differently. For them, nature is permeated with life and 
charged with value. Any process of change in nature is necessarily qualitative and 
creates novelties. In this framework, nature and human beings are also in a mutual 
relation. Thus, in terms of creating culture, nature is a help, not a hindrance (ibid.). 
Fang ultimately concluded that the current forms of scientific development 
should not be pursued. Because modern science was rooted in Cartesian dual-
isms and viewed human beings only as mechanistic components of a society that 
was separated from nature, he considered it essentially dogmatic and incapable of 
providing the basis for real democracy. It was, in fact, an obstacle to democratic 
development, because 
pure science arises out of the desire for knowledge; through the applica-
tion of abstract laws it seeks to arrive at purely logical conclusions, and 
absolute justice, without taking into account their effective reality. Its line 
of reasoning always transcends human life. (Fang 1936, 194) 
For Fang Dongmei, modern Europeans view science as the systematic study of 
nature, organic as well as inorganic, separate from the concrete human beings. 
He thus believed that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities 
tends to exclude humans from real nature. Science seeks pure objectivity while 
men, according to modern psychology and epistemology up to the mid-19th 
century, are essentially subjective. In such a realm of “pure objectivity”, science 
tries to analyse the abstract. It remains limited, however, to what is mainly quan-
titative and to determining what is exact. In order to reduce everything, it works 
with formulas of identity. In Fang’s view, humans should not be treated in this 
way (Fang 1980b, 19).
Hence, he believed that the Chinese tradition not only implied certain seeds that 
could grow and develop into a democratic system, but also possessed certain char-
acteristics that could lead society towards a true democracy which, thanks to the 
organic connection between man and nature, would be much more reasonable and 
legitimate than Western-style democracy. This view arises out of Fang’s general 
conviction that Chinese philosophy could help resolve the current crisis of the 
prevailing Western philosophies and empirical sciences, a crisis which derived 
from their dualistic, rationalistic and scientific nature.
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Self and Individuality 
The common Western arguments based on the belief that the Chinese notion 
of the Self does not possess any strong “individualistic” connotations are, for the 
most part, too generalizing. Besides, the Western notion of an isolated, delimited 
and completely independent individual is, to a great extent, also a product of the 
ideologies of modernization. Thus, when treating or exploring the Chinese notion 
of the “self-realization” of the Self, we must proceed with due caution, for whoever 
has been acculturated within the discourses of Western modernity automatically 
tends to equate this term with the self-realization of an individual existence.
David Hall and Roger Ames (1998, 25) emphasize that the notion of “individual-
ity” has two different meanings. First, it refers to a particular, uniform, indivisible 
entity which can, due to a certain feature, be included in a certain class. As an el-
ement (or a member) of a certain kind or class, this “individuality” is interchange-
able. This concept of individuality underlies the equality of all individuals before 
the law, the concept of universal human rights, equal access to opportunities, and 
so on. According to Hall and Ames (ibid.), it is precisely this understanding of 
the individual which also makes it possible to elaborate notions such as autono-
my, equality, free will, and the like. This type of Self belongs in the domain of a 
one-dimensional, empirical self or, to express it in Chinese terms, in the sphere of 
the “external ruler” (wai wang 外王).
But Hall and Ames point out that the notion of the individual can also be linked 
to the notions of uniqueness and singularity, which do not possess any connota-
tions of affiliation, or membership in any class. Here, equality is posited on the 
basis of the parity principle. According to them, it is this sense of “unique indi-
viduality” which enables us to understand the traditional Confucian notion of 
the Self. Fang Dongmei has advocated a very similar idea, emphasizing that the 
uniqueness which underpins the Confucian Self is already a value in itself:
Dao is omnipresent and unites everything in itself to an entity. There-
fore, we say that the great Dao is unlimited. But, on the other hand, it 
also contains specific particularities. We have to accept the uniqueness of 
these particular entities as being true. Every particularity which has been 
realized bears in itself a tendency of value. Thus, its significance cannot 
be denied. (Fang 2004d, 259)
However, even this kind of Self which possesses a unique individuality is “unique” 
in a “typical Chinese” (i.e., relational) way, for it constitutes itself by means of the 
quality of its relations with the external world. 
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A person becomes recognized, distinguished, or renowned by virtue of a 
social or communal deference to the quality of their character. Much of 
the effort in understanding the traditional Confucian conception of the 
Self has to do with clarifying this distinction … While the definition of 
the Self as irreducibly social certainly precludes autonomous individu-
ality, it does not rule out the second, less familiar notion of uniqueness 
expressed in terms of roles and relationships. (ibid.)
Thus, in exploring Fang’s views on the relation between the transcendent and 
empirical self, we must bear in mind that in the Chinese tradition to which it 
belongs, this relation (in contrast with the dualistic model) has always been pos-
ited a priori within the structures of the different social networks which form the 
individual identity. 
The same holds true for the epistemological dimensions of the Self. In his (some-
times slightly too idealizing interpretations of Chinese culture), Fang Dongmei 
proceeds from the holistic worldview in which noumenon is equated with phe-
nomenon, and in which they are both equally permeated by the sphere of values. 
Fang writes (1957, 60–61) that the universe is a place to live in, and not a place 
to escape from, because it is a realm of value. Thus, for him, humanness or the 
human condition (ren xing 人性) is something to rely upon, and not something 
to dispense with, because it has been proved to be not sinful, but innocent. This 
holds equally true for the whole universe, which is a coalescing of matter and 
spirit. It is, in other words, a transformed realm wherein matter and spirit tend 
to assume a higher form of perfection, which can be called exalted life. Universal 
life permeates the universe and penetrates everything that exists. In the process 
of continuous creation, it increases the value of what is already valuable, as well as 
what is quite indifferent. For Fang Dongmei, the existential aim of human life is 
the realization of the supreme Good, which, however, is not merely to be found 
in some “other world”. Hence Fang stresses that from the very start we must learn 
what is most precious in life by actually living in the real world. 
Therefore, in his system, there is no place for any kind of separation within the 
Self. Fang does not accept the concept of the subject and thus fails to see the line 
dividing its transcendent factors from its empirical ones. He remains loyal to his 
holistic metaphysical pragmatism:
Because human beings possess both a rational and a spiritual nature, 
their experience of the Divine and of human nature is direct and not 
inferential; it is intimate, not separate, intuitive and not analytical. This 
direct experience permits Chinese philosophers to posit that the ultimate 
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goodness of human nature is rooted in the divine nature. And while hu-
man beings can certainly lose this capacity or potential, this loss is never 
casual, but is due to the individual straying or deviating from the heaven-
ly way. (Fang 1979, 270)
The Problematic Nature of the Human Subject and the Fusion of 
Reason and Emotion
For Fang Dongmei, the idea of the subject is therefore something which actually 
distances men from their humanity. He argued that this idea was closely linked to 
the development of modern European science, understood as the systematic ex-
ploration of an organic and inorganic “nature” completely separated from human 
beings. In his work, there is a clear tendency to emphasize de-anthropomorphism 
(Fang 1983, 20–25). The distinction between primary and secondary qualities 
tends to exclude human beings from their real nature. As noted above, science 
pursues pure objectivity while man, in the view of modern psychology and episte-
mology up to the mid-19th century, is essentially subjective (Fang 1978, 223–25)
Subjectivity is thus something which is diametrically opposed to and in contra-
diction with pure objectivity, which science uses to analyse abstraction, record 
the existent based on quantitative criteria and reduce the multiple dimensions of 
phenomena to formulas for different identities (Fang 1979, 258–60). For Fang, 
this methodology was essentially the negation of men as natural beings situated 
within the interwoven organic structures that constitute the universe, as well as in 
time and space.
Although Fang Dongmei was the only member of the second generation of 
Modern New Confucians who had not been a student of Xiong Shili 熊十力, 
his work is nonetheless linked to this pioneer of the Confucian revival precisely 
due to a similar insight into the Self. In this context, Xiong’s view was based on 
the Buddhist contradictions and paradoxes revolving around the sustainable Self 
(the awareness of prajna) and the transient awareness of life and death. Similar 
to Xiong, Fang also tried to resolve this paradox through a complementary in-
teraction between substance (ti 體) and function (yong 用). For him, the mind is 
a sort of “supervisor” that governs the operations of all human properties, capac-
ities and faculties. It is both substance and function. As a substance, it can em-
brace infinite modes of “thought” that are directed at any conceivable object. Its 
function instead consists of the ways in which it acts spontaneously upon things 
(Fang 1980b, 103).
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With respect to the infinity of individual human characteristics, all these innate 
differences seek a harmonious fusion in the unity of an infinite multiplicity within 
the great Dao. Once they are in Dao, they can no longer get lost in the infinite 
emptiness, or in the trivial solitude of separateness or some apparent form of 
equality or equivalence (Fang 2004c, 261). 
Fang does not refer to the subject, but rather to the “subjective spirit” (zhuti 
jingshen 主體精神) which is an inseparable part of the ontologization of “life”. 
In his philosophy, the “objective world” (keguan shijie 客觀世界) is necessarily 
joined by means of a “continuous organic creativity of the clear spirit” (shengming 
shengshengbuxide cuangzaoli 生命生生不息的創造力) to the “subjective spirit of 
humanity” (zhutide renlei jingshen 主體的人類精神). The subjective spirit in this 
sphere of life first transforms itself—through objectivization—into the objective 
spirit, and then ontologizes itself into a transcendent spirit. Only through self-re-
alization can the individual preserve the organic bond with all that exists and be 
incorporated into the process of continuous organic creativity, which forms the 
basis of life. Thus, Fang concludes (1981, 23–28) that between the two paths of 
self-abnegation and self-affirmation, the Chinese tradition stresses a third way, 
that of self-development and self-realization.
This process of self-development and self-realization is, of course, closely linked 
to the inner spiritual cultivation of individuals. We think of the individual in 
terms of observed actualities and idealized possibilities. From actuality to possi-
bility, there is a complex process of self-development. According to Fang (1981, 
27), this self-development can be achieved through self-(cultivation) and a full 
range of self-realization. 
However, the awareness of the individual’s unity with all that exists which results 
from this process of self-realization is not metaphysical in the sense of an abstract 
separation from the actual reality. The concrete values of human life do not belong 
either to the sphere of idealized imagination, nor to a transcendental paradise, for 
if they did, it would deprive them of any real value, as it would not be possible 
to realize them in the real world. At the same time, they cannot remain enclosed 
within the inner world of the individual, otherwise that person would remain 
trapped in a subjective egocentrism which cannot benefit any human community. 
The only sphere in which the individual can realize and fulfil these values and in 
which they can transcend the narrow limits of their own personal interests is the 
state. For Fang, the state represents the only possible form of extended existence, 
which guarantees the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number 
of people. In order to reach this goal and to liberate ourselves from self-bondage, 
social constraint and enslavement, we must overcome the many difficulties that 
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stand in our way through effort, courage, perseverance and sagacity. Li Chenyang 
(2002, 278) writes, in this context Fang laid stress upon the fact that we are “real 
beings”, bound by the limitations and imperfections of the “real world”. This is 
why we continuously have to seek to remedy the numerous—internal and exter-
nal—imperfections that hinder us in achieving this goal. If we do all this, we can 
escape from the limitations below and behold the light of day in perfect freedom 
and happiness (see ibid.).
The “real” human being is a Self, composed of reason and emotions. For Fang 
Dongmei, reason was rooted in the rational structure (li 理) of the universe 
which, however, is also defined by feelings (qing 情). His basic supposition was 
that both elements formed a correlative and complementary binary category 
that arose from the ultimate pole (taiji 太極). Within the onto-epistemological 
wholeness which is characteristic of the classical Chinese tradition, this category 
provides both the basis of philosophical thought and the foundation of existence 
as such.
In Fang’s interpretation, “li” is the absolute (highest) expression of objective phe-
nomena, while “qing” represents the fundamental feature of subjectivity. Because 
his concept of “life” includes both notions, it clearly implies the sense of transcend-
ing the separation between subject and object (Fang, Keli and Li Jinquan 1989, 
III/894). In his Three Kinds of Philosophical Wisdom (哲學三慧), Fang Dongmei 
also unites the notions “li 理” and “qing 情” into an epistemological concept of 
“sensuous reason” (qingli 情理). In its fusion of feelings and rationality, this con-
cept provides a fundamental and original core, or basis of comprehension, and can 
thus be seen as a “seed of wisdom” (zhihui chongzi) (ibid.).
Qingli 情理 belongs to the original symbolic images within the system 
of philosophical terminology. Qing 情 arises in connection with li 理 
and the existence of the latter is again dependent on the former. In their 
magical interaction they circulate around each other and are thus each 
other’s original cause. The realm of their coexistence can be recognized by 
intuition, but this is difficult to express or explain. (Fang 2007, 2)
Because qingli 情理 implies both reason and feelings, it can only be recognized 
through the intuitive, and not the mere rational or analytical method. This epis-
temological dimension of qingli 情理 is therefore reflected not only in the field 
of perception, but also in the field of interpretation, for it is a concept that cannot 
be expressed, since it surpasses all semantic distinctions that define the concrete 
reality of human life:
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The qingli 情理 sphere is both distant and near, deep and superficial, 
open and concealed. There is nothing which can be seen beyond it, and 
the structure of its inwardness can only be defined by our hearing and 
vision, and the cultivation of our personality. (ibid.) 
And yet human beings need both qing 情 and li 理 for their existence and life: 
“Human life is conditioned by qing 情 and human existence by li 理” (ibid.).
For Fang, reason as such (i.e. when separated from feelings) represents the third 
of six levels of personal development. This level corresponds to human mastery 
of the natural world and manifests itself in the culture of science. While Fang ac-
knowledges the importance of this aspect of human development, he argues that 
humanity must pursue the even higher spheres of art (beauty), morality (good-
ness) and perfection (harmony), i.e. the spheres to which human beings cannot 
gain access without possessing intuitive (moral) knowledge.
Conclusion
In their unification, this correlative complementarity of reason and emotion con-
stitutes the innate moral configuration of human beings. In a similar way, Fang 
seems to resolve many other apparent contradictions between oppositional con-
cepts that constitute his philosophical system. Just as its fundamental holism is 
not a static monolithic construct, but rather an arrangement of dynamic creativity, 
his concept of democracy is a relational and not a normative one, for it is based 
upon a dynamic complementarity between individuals and the state. For the same 
reason, which arises from the fundamental design of the Chinese philosophical 
framework of reference,5 the concept of the individual in Fang’s system is marked 
by her essential, relational embeddedness into society on the one hand, but also by 
her radical uniqueness on the other. 
A general and widely assumed presumption is that Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi 
were the only two theoreticians of the second generation of Modern New Confu-
cianism that developed their own philosophical systems. This presumption might 
simply rest on the fact that Fang Dongmei’s work has hitherto not been much 
researched. A more detailed examination of his work would show that it is cer-
tainly worth studying in a more profound way. In his philosophy, Fang Dongmei 
5 For a detailed explanation about the frameworks of reference and their role in individual philo-
sophical systems, see Rošker 2015, 59–63. The referential frameworks that underlie typical or dom-
inant philosophical discourses in China are marked by dynamic holism, binary categories, principle 
of complementarity and the transformation of the empirical into the transcendental. 
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reproduces and modernizes the main paradigms of traditional philosophical Con-
fucianism in a very innovative way, without departing, from the main classical 
ideas and methods by which it was determined. Because of these characteristics, 
Fang Dongmei can doubtless be counted not only among the most creative repre-
sentatives of the specific philosophical stream of Modern Confucianism, but also 
among the greatest representatives of modern Taiwanese philosophy in general.
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